An insider trading policy is a critical aspect of a firm's internal governance which ensures the maintenance of corporate transparency. We examine the effect of trading policies on the returns to trades by corporate insiders over two periods: one where the adoption of a policy is voluntary and another where it is mandatory. In the former, we find that the requirement to notify the firm prior to trading does not result in lower trade returns on days outside the permitted trading windows. Where adoption of a policy is mandatory, trade returns made during the restricted windows are higher and the requirement to notify prior to trading significantly reduces these returns. The mandatory disclosure of a trading policy is effective in reducing returns from insider trading, suggesting improved investor confidence through greater transparency. 
The Effect of Voluntary versus Mandatory Adoption of Trading Policies on the Returns to

Insider Trades
Introduction
A firm's insider trading policy is an integral part of the overall firm governance system describing how a company is directed and managed such that objectives are met, risks are monitored and performance maximised. The role of a trading policy within the governance framework is to ensure and promote ethical and responsible decision making by insiders so that investor confidence is preserved and investor protection maintained. Furthermore, it provides transparency around policies surrounding insider activities, in particular restrictions on trading. If insider trading is viewed as an agency cost because private benefits can be extracted at the expense of other shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried 2003) , an effective governance system can be expected to reduce this cost by active monitoring of insiders' trading activities (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon 2000).
Self-imposed trading policies work in conjunction with existing country level insider trading regulation which is enforced by market regulators. Lee, Lemmon, Li and Sequiera (2014) find that firm-imposed voluntary restrictions on insider trading activities are effective in reducing the exploitation of private benefits. In this study, we apply a micro approach to investigate the effect of investor protection (under the umbrella of corporate governance) on rent extraction via insider trading. Investor protection is proxied by a firm's trading policy under two regimes of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. We examine how a firm-imposed trading policy affects the returns to insider trades, when the trades are conducted in periods demarcated as "blackout periods" or "permitted periods" in both the voluntary and mandatory disclosure environments. In the accounting and finance literature and regulation, disclosure has been assumed to be a device which reduces information asymmetry, leading to less potential for opportunism. The regulation around the timely disclosure of insider trades is one example of this assumption. Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) also provide theoretical support by showing that prompt disclosure of insider trades reduces returns associated with them.
Mandatory disclosure of trading policies is expected to result in a better information environment because Huddart et al. (2001) show that the disclosure accelerates price discovery and reduces returns to trades. Corporate information transparency has been found to be negatively related to the number of insider purchase and sale transactions and their profitability (Gu and Li, 2012) .
However, in their investigation of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans in the US, Henderson, Jagolinzer and Muller (2015) show that voluntary disclosure increases insider trading returns due to the legal cover provided by the disclosure. That is, the voluntary disclosure generated protection for opportunistic trading. The same could apply with the mandatory disclosure of trading policies where insiders trade opportunistically for higher returns and escape scrutiny because of a disclosed restrictive trading policy. We exploit this tension in the literature on mandatory disclosure of insider trading policies Prior studies, including Anand and Beny (2007) , Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Cremers and Nair (2005) , show the effects of good corporate governance on firm value. Directly relevant to this study are the findings that strong corporate governance reduces returns from insider trading (Chang, Hillman and Watson 2005; Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog 2006; Jagolinzer, Larcker and Taylor 2011; Ravina and Sapienza 2010) . Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) use block monitoring to proxy for governance, Chang, Hillman and Watson (2005) use aspects of the board, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) employ Gompers et al.'s (2003) Governance Index and Jagolinzer, Larcker and Taylor (2011) apply the general counsel's approval. In contrast, using shareholder protection, Fidrmuc, Korczak and Korczak (2013) 1 The Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASXCGC) released its Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations which included ten core principles and guidance on implementation in the form of best practice recommendations. Firms were required to disclose in the annual report the extent to which the best practice recommendations were observed and, if recommendations were not adhered to, the reasons for not doing so. Principle 3 of the Recommendations is relevant to trading policies and this study because it discusses the need for integrity among those who influence company strategy and financial performance. It also actively promotes ethical and responsible decision making. In particular, Recommendation 3.2 refers to the establishment of a policy concerning trading in company securities by directors, senior executives and employees and the disclosure of such a policy.
Our study also differs from prior work as we examine a range of items in the firm's insider trading policy. We find returns to insiders are higher when they trade in the restricted trading windows, inferring that insiders profit from information that they are privy to during those times. Within firms that impose blackout periods, the returns to insiders are lower when prior notification of trading is required. The effects of the prior notification requirement are evident and effective in 2013
where the adoption of policies is mandatory.
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the institutional and regulatory background while the hypotheses are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the sample used, the research method and provide the descriptive statistics. The results are presented and discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the study.
Background: Institutional and regulatory
In Australia, corporate insiders are required to report any changes to their shareholdings to the 
Hypotheses
Trading policy restrictions and insider trade returns
The controversies around insider trading can be generally classified into rent extraction by insiders and improvement in the information environment via the information contained within trades. With respect to rent extraction, Ausubel (1990), Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and others maintain that insider trading transfers wealth from uninformed investors to informed insiders such that information efficiency and liquidity are adversely affected. On the other hand, Manne (1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983) assert its informational benefits where such trading accelerates the flow of private information into share prices. Therefore, the net effect of insider trading on the information environment would depend on the aggregate of the cost of rent extraction and the benefit of information content. Our study examines this effect in both voluntary and mandatory settings. If insider trading is a mechanism for rent extraction, then improved shareholder protection via more restrictive trading policies will result in lower returns following insider trades (Fidrmuc et al. (2013) refer to this effect as the monitoring hypothesis).
On the other hand, if it represents a channel for private information to be incorporated into price, trading policies may not affect the returns to trades. This is because the policies have created an information environment where information is reflected in prices such that there are no excess returns to trades. However, there could be another scenario where trading policies are overly restrictive, resulting in higher returns to trades, due to inefficient prices.
Much of the work done on the effect of insider trading policies has been limited to timing restrictions on trades. For example, Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000) (2014) did not specifically examine whether these trades were conducted within restricted windows.
Trading restrictions are expected to reduce insider returns from trading because Roulstone (2003) and Denis and Xu (2013) show that trading restrictions are accompanied by higher compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. One side effect of trading restrictions however is higher corporate risk taking (Yusnadi, 2014) .
Based on Bettis et al. (2000) and Jagolinzer et al. (2011) , we predict that when insiders choose to trade within restricted windows, they do so opportunistically in order extract rents from their private information. Therefore, the returns are expected to be higher compared to trading during other times.
H1:
Insiders earn higher returns from trades made in the restricted windows, compared to trades at other times.
Jagolinzer et al. (2011) examine the impact of the general counsel who was responsible for shaping internal governance within the firm. They report that profits are lower when general council approval is required prior to trading. While Beny (2005) reports a negative relationship between the quality of insider trading law and returns, Bris (2005) shows that enforcement of insider trading laws results in greater incidences of insider trading and higher returns from such trading. Given that effective corporate governance mechanisms can reduce insiders' ability to extract rents from other shareholders (Chang et al. 2005; Fidrmuc et al. 2006) , we propose that the requirement to notify the firm prior to trading is likely to reduce the insiders' profit when they trade.
H2:
Insiders in firms with the requirement to notify the firm prior to trading earn lower returns on trades in the restricted windows, compared with insiders in firms without requirements to notify prior to trading.
Sample and method
The regulatory requirements relating to the trading policies of Australian firms can be roughly The category disclosure score (ITP_Score) requires at least one item in a category to be disclosed to attain a value of 1. Otherwise, the score for that category is 0. The scores of each category were aggregated to arrive at a total score for each firm year. Therefore, the ITP_Score's minimum and maximum are 0 and 9 respectively and equal weighting is given to each category.
The nine categories are as follows: We examine if a relationship exists between the adoption and restrictiveness of the insider trading policy, and the characteristics of the firm using the following logistic regression:
where, In a different specification of the above model, we replace the binary dependent variable with a continuous variable measuring the prescriptiveness of the insider trading policy in the firm.
ITP_Score is the score based on the number of trading policy categories disclosed as described above.
To identify trades to be included in our analysis, the following requirements were used to arrive at the final sample: the trade must be an on-market trade, the interest held by the director must be direct, the trade is not an initial or final change in shareholdings and the trades must not be due to exercise of stock options, bonus issues and rights issues. These requirements reduced the sample to 1,458 trades in 2007 and 2,710 trades in 2013.
We apply the standard event study method where the event is the reported date of a change in director interest. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated with these trades were measured as market model adjusted returns over five, 10, and 20 days after the trade date. Therefore, CAR is estimated as:
where CARi,t+k is the cumulative market adjusted return of share i on day t+k, CR i,t is the ratio of the price of share i on day t+k relative to its price at the start of the period on day t and CRMi,t is the analogous price relative for the market, proxied by the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index.
Beta for the stock trade is estimated using the returns of the stock and market in the estimation period of (-110, -10) where day 0 is the trade date.
We use Ordinary Least Squares regression with robust standard errors to analyse the relation between returns to insider trades and the individual firm's trading policy, while controlling for trade and firm characteristics. The following equation was used to test the relationship 7 :
, 1 
7 The return to sales was multiplied by -1 to allow a combination of the returns to purchases with the returns to sales. period where the firm has not specified if it is a restricted or permitted trading period and zero otherwise; and Blackout = a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trade was made in a period where the firm has specified that it is a restricted trading period and zero otherwise.
The variables Unclassified and Blackout allow us to examine the returns to trades during the various trading windows. In addition, the variable PriorNotification permits us to inspect if the requirement to notify prior to trading mitigates the returns during the various trading windows.
We control for the size of transaction (both TxnValue and RelVol), the lag between trade and report dates (LAG) which is indicative of the insider's intention to conceal her information advantage, the growth prospects proxied by the market to book ratio (MB), and the size of the firm (MVE).
Results
Descriptive statistics
There are 270 firms in the sample for 2007 and 296 firms for 2013. Of these, only 125 firms appear in both time period samples. The high drop off appears to be due to smaller firms not surviving until 2013. Table 1 [Insert Table 1 Table 1 Panel B shows that the firms in our two sample periods are similar when comparing the market value of equity (MVE), amount of total assets (TA) and the market to book ratio (MB).
However, there is a significant increase in the analyst coverage (Analysts) from an average of 7.9 in 2007 to 10.6 in 2013. Table 1 Panel C shows the size of insider transactions has also increased in terms of relative volume traded (RelVol). However, the transaction value (TxnValue) and the lag between the trade and report dates (Lag) have not changed across the two years. Table 2 presents the OLS and logistic regression models for the two variables, and ITP_Score During the voluntary period, analyst monitoring of firms and frequent trading by insiders are found to put pressure on firms to disclose more restrictive policies to mitigate the reduction in investor confidence and firm reputation loss when insider trading occurs in these firms (Ramsay and Shekhar, 2012). In comparison, when these firms are required to disclose a trading policy (which at a minimum should contain details on closed periods, trading restrictions, trading outside the policy, exceptional cases when trading is allowed and written clearance for such trading), only firms with growth opportunities and frequent insider trading continue to invest in more restrictive policies. It is also not surprising that analyst following has no influence on the likelihood of prior notification, given that it is now a requirement under the mandatory policy.
Relationship between insider trading policy, firm characteristics and frequency of insider trading
[Insert Table 2 about here]
In Table 3 , we present the regressions of the frequency of insider purchases and sales on the insider trading policy score and firm characteristics. The conclusions from this specification of the relation are generally consistent with those drawn from Insiders are known to be contrarian traders; trading in anticipation of future price reversals (Seyhun, 1992) and trading contrary to the market's overreaction to past performance (Rozeff and Zaman, 1998). The coefficients on MB indicate insiders' contrarian behaviour and are consistent with trading against misvaluation, as reported in Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) . That is, insiders trades are negatively related to the market to book ratio (as shown in Table 3 ) and trade returns are positively related to the market to book ratio (shown in Table 5 [Insert Table 3 about here] Table 4 shows the frequency of and returns to trading within and outside of the restricted [Insert Table 4 that require insiders to notify before trading, the Blackout indicator could not be used for this model. The returns to unclassified trades are higher than the returns to permitted trades (t-stat. of 1.57 and 2.16) when returns is measured using the five day window. However, the coefficient on the indicator variable Unclassified is not significant when returns are measured over the longer horizon. The coefficients on the interaction term Unclassified*PriorNotification in all models for purchases and sales are negative suggesting the prior notification requirement has a mitigating effect on returns. However, the coefficients are significant at the conventional levels for sales only when returns is measured using the five and 10 day windows.
The effect of trading restrictions on insider trading profits
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The regression results for 2013 are presented in Panels C and D, and the conclusions differ from those for 2007. Models 1, 2 and 3 show that returns to purchases made during blackout periods are significantly higher than the returns to permitted trades (t-stat. of 1.81, 2.95 and 2.66 respectively), supporting Hypothesis H1. The coefficients on the interaction term Blackout*PriorNotification in all three models for both purchases and sales are negative though only statistically significant in models 2 and 3 (t-stat. of -1.74 and -3.06). Overall, hypothesis H2
is supported with the prior notification requirement reducing insider trade returns. The findings are consistent with Jagolinzer et al. (2012) where trading profits in restricted trade windows are significantly lower when general counsel approval to trade is required.
Conclusions
We examine the relation between firm-imposed insider trading policy and the returns associated with insider trades. A firm's insider trading policy explains and directs the behaviour of insiders when they trade in their own firm's shares. Such policies are important because they provide confidence to investors that insiders are not abusing their position of privilege within the firm by extracting private benefits to the detriment of other shareholders. The trading policy is expected to affect the firm's information environment and the behaviour of insiders when they trade due to greater transparency of the specific contents of the trading policy. This is specifically due to the requirement to obtain permission before trading can occur, timely reporting of trades after trading has occurred and restrictions on when trading can occur.
Our results show that the introduction of Best Practice Recommendations by the ASX Corporate
Governance Council (voluntary disclosure period) has seen many firms choose to adopt and disclose their insider trading policies. Following the implementation of ASX Listing Rule 12.12 where the requirement is for all firms to adopt a trading policy, this has led to increases in some of the details disclosed within the policies. During the voluntary period, firms with more analyst following provided more detailed policies, measured by the number of categories and items disclosed. We also find firms with more frequent trading by insiders with more detailed policies, perhaps to mitigate the likelihood and perception of insider misconduct.
When the returns to trades conducted within and outside the restricted windows were compared, the returns in the former were generally higher. Not all firms impose these additional restrictions on the timing of insider trades and it appears that these restrictions were ineffective and noncompliant insiders benefited more from their trades. However when we also included the prior notification requirement, the returns to these trades decreased, showing that the notification requirement was effective in reducing the extraction of private benefits.
Our findings indicate that a firm's insider trading policy is an important and effective governance mechanism to reduce the extraction of private benefits of control by affecting the firm's information environment. Its development should be further encouraged, as seen from the mandatory requirement for listed firms to disclose a trading policy as of January 2011, resulting in a reduction in insider trade returns. Our findings provide some support for prescriptive rules on insider trading policy, over a principles-based approach. It appears that, within the mandatory period, firms are not simply ticking the boxes. Rather there is effective adoption and disclosure of firm specific insider trading policies resulting in a change in insider trading behaviour and increased investor confidence. However, there is room for improvement because blackout period trades still exist. The effects of various characteristics of a trading policy on a firm's information environment should be better understood together with its effect on insider trading behaviour. It is possible that the reaction to an insider's trade depends not only on the size of the transactions but also its timing within the firm's financial year. The table shows the use of insider trading policy and the categories of items discussed in the policies for firms in the S&P ASX300 index for years 2007 and 2013. The table reports the proportion of firms with a policy that includes items in the following categories in their policy: definitions of information on which insiders are not allowed to trade and reinforcement of regulation (Def_info), shares and financial products the policy refers to (App_itp), Restrictions on short term dealing (St_dealing), awareness and monitoring of compliance with policy (Comp_policy), details of director shareholding requirements (Dir_shh), reporting of trading (Report_trading), prior notification/approval of trading (Prior_notification), windows in which directors cannot trade (Dir_cannottrade), and windows in which directors can trade (Dir_cantrade). The table also reports the mean number of categories (ITP_Score) discussed in the trading policies. MVE is the market capitalisation in $ millions; TA is total assets in $ millions; MB is the market to book ratio and Analysts is the number of analyst following. TxnValue is the transaction value measured as the number of shares traded multiplied by the trade price on the trade date in $ millions; RelVol is the transaction volume divided by the number of shares outstanding expressed as a percentage. Lag is the number of days between the trade date and the date the trade is reported to the Exchange ITP_Score is the number of categories discussed in the trading policy. Model 2 is a probit model where the dependent variable is the binary variable Prior_Notification which takes the value of one if the policy specifies that prior notification is to be given before the insider could trade and zero otherwise. Analysts is the number of analyst following. MVE is the market capitalisation in $ millions. MB is the market to book ratio and Count is the number of insider trades conducted during the year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) levels, respectively. Note: The dependent variable, Count, is the number of insider trades during the year. ITP_Score is the number of categories discussed in the trading policy. Prior_Notification which takes the value of one if the policy specifies that prior notification is to be given before the insider could trade and zero otherwise. Dir_cannottrade (Dir_cantrade) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the policy specifies windows in which directors cannot (can) trade and zero otherwise. Analysts is the number of analyst following. MVE is the market capitalisation in $ millions. MB is the market to book ratio. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) levels, respectively. (-110,-10) where day 0 is the trade date. Blackout (Permitted) windows are specified by firms as periods where insiders are prohibited from trading (permitted to trade). Unclassified windows are periods that have not been specified by firms as periods where trading could or could not occur. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) levels, respectively. Txn_Value is the transaction value measured as the number of shares traded multiplied by the trade price; Rel_Vol is the transaction volume divided by the total number of shares outstanding as at the end of the financial year; Lag is the lag between the trade date and the date the trade is reported to the Exchange; MVE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation at the beginning of the year; Analysts is the number of analyst following; MB is the market to book ratio at the beginning of the year; Blackout (Permitted) windows are specified by firms as periods where insiders are prohibited from trading (permitted to trade) and zero otherwise. Unclassified windows are periods that have not be specified by firms as periods where trading could or could not occur. Prior_Notification which takes the value of one if the policy specifies that prior notification is to be given before the insider could trade and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) levels, respectively.
